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Collateral Damage
David Lefkowitz

The phrase "collateral damage" refers to harm done to persons, animals,
or things that agents are not morally permitted to target in the conduct of
war, as a side effect of attacks on persons, animals, or things that agents are
morally permitted to target in the conduct of war. Call the first categorythat is, those persons, animals, or things that agents are not morally permitted to target - illegitimate targets of war, and the second category
legitimate targets of war. Collateral damage, then, refers to harm done to
illegitimate targets of war as a side effect of attacks on legitimate targets of
war. As this characterization indicates, a complete response to the question of when, if ever, acts of war that cause collateral damage are morally
justifiable must address harm done to private and public property, domestic and wild animals, and the environment. In this essay, however, I will
focus solely on harm done to persons who are illegitimate targets of war,
as a side effect of attacks on legitimate targets. My reason for doing so
is twofold. First, most historical and contemporary discussion focuses on
the rightness or wrongness of this particular kind of collateral damage.'
Second, rightly or wrongly, most people appear to be more concerned
with harm done to persons than they are with harm done to animals, the
environment, or inanimate objects.
Philosophers disagree over what makes a person a legitimate target
of war. Some argue that only those who directly pose an (unjust) threat
of harm may be targeted, while others argue that it is merely his or her
1

For discussion of collateral damage to private property, sec Cohn :VlcKeogh, ln11orrnt
Civilians: 7/ir Momlity of Killing in \for (:-.Jew York: Palgravc, 2002); Whitley Kaufman,
"What Is the Scope of Civilian lmmunitv in \\'artimc?"Jo11m11/ of.\Iilitary Fthirs 2 (200:\):

18li-94.
I am grateful to Emily Crookston, Heather Cert, Larrv \!av, Terry \lcConnell, and l\lichael
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being morally responsible for an uajust threat of harm that justifies targeting a person, even if that person does not pose the threat. 2 On either
view, the category of legitimate targets of war significantly overlaps the
category of combatants, while the category of illegitimate targets of war
significantly overlaps the category of noncombatants. Therefore, I will
sometimes characterize collateral damage as harm done to noncombatants as a side effect of an attack on combatants (or a military target),
a description commonly employed in public discussion. Nevertheless,
it is important to remember that the categories of legitimate target of
war and combatant and the categories of illegitimate target of war and
noncombatant do not overlap completely.
We need not resolve the debate over what makes a person morally liable
to attack in war in order to make significant progress in establishing the
moral status of wartime acts that cause collateral damage. What such a
discussion does seem to require, though, is that there be some categorical
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war, since such
a distinction appears to be essential to the very concept of collateral
damage. As will become clear later, certain types of alleged justification
for acts of war that harm noncombatants may find it difficult to justify
treating this distinction as fundamental.
One last preliminary point remains before we turn to a moral assessment of collateral damage. Some theorists argue that combatants may
justifiably kill only if they fight for a just cause, while others argue that
combatants may justifiably kill even if the state they serve is morally unjustified in going to war. To avoid this debate, I will assume throughout that
those combatants inflicting collateral damage are members of a state that
acts permissibly in going to war.
The discussion of what, if anything, morally justifies collateral damagecausing acts of war proceeds as follows. In Section I, I criticize the most
common argumentative strategy employed to defend such acts, namely,
appeal to the doctrine of double effect. In Section II, I suggest that one
prominent nonconsequentialist approach to moral theorizing, namely,
social contract theory broadly construed, will also find it exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that collateral damage-causing acts of war are permissible. Finally, in Section III, I consider consequentialist justifications
2

Michael Walzer,just and Unjust Wars, 3rd Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2000); Robert
Fullinwider, "War and Innocence," in International Ethics, ed. Beitz et al. (Princeton, NJ:
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for collateral damage. I argue that while such justifications may be more
plausible than some writers in the just war tradition have thought, there
are still some reasons to find them unsatisfactory. Thus this chapter points
to a skeptical conclusion with respect to the moral justifiability of wartime
acts that inflict collateral damage: given the elusiveness of a compelling
moral justification for collateral damage, and its practically inevitable
occurrence in modern armed conflicts, it appears impossible to wage
war without acting immorally.

I. The Doctrine of Double Effect and Collateral Damage
Many contributors to the just war tradition attempt to justify military
operations that produce collateral damage by appealing to the doctrine
of double effect (henceforth the DDE)) Applied specifically to acts of war,
the DDE holds that harm done to noncombatants is morally permissible
if and only if:
The combatant intends to attack a legitimate target of war, and to
do so in a manner that conforms to the moral constraints on such
acts.
2. The combatant does not intend to cause harm to noncombatants
as a means to achieving his intended goal. Rather, the combatant
merely foresees that his attack on a legitimate target of war will
cause harm to illegitimate targets of war as a side effect.
3. There is a sufficient reason to warrant the combatants' acting in a
way that can be reasonably expected to cause harm to noncombatants (or illegitimate targets of war, more broadly).
L

Conditions 1 and 2 reflect the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war central to the concept of collateral damage: combatants may not aim to harm noncombatants either as an end (condition 1) or as a means to an end (condition 2). A side effect of an outcome the combatant intends to bring about, however, is by definition
one at which he or she does not aim: the combatant may foresee that his
3 Walzer, just and Unjust Hars, pp. 151-59; Elizabeth Anscomhe, "\Nar and Murder," in
Nurlrar Wrapons and Christian Consrirnrl', ed. Walter Stein (London: l\-!crlin, 1960); Paul
Ramsey, 17iejusl liar: Fnrre and l'o/itirnl Hesjionsibilit_)' (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1968). International law, specifically the Geneva Conventions as understood in the 1977
Protocols, also appears to reflect the DDE: see 1977 Gcm·,·a Protocol I Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of
Open View.
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action will result in harm to noncombatants, but he does not intend it.
Such a combatant respects the distinction between those things he may
and may not target while waging war.
That the combatant does not intend to cause harm to noncombatants
does not suffice to justify his conduct, however. As condition 3 indicates,
only certain considerations justify causing even unintended harm to noncombatants. Most discussants of the DDE label this requirement the proportionality condition and describe it as requiring that the harm suffered
by noncombatants as a result of a given act of war be proportional to the
good achieved as a result of the same act.4 This formulation of the third
condition of the DDE can be misleading, however, insofar as it suggests
that the condition ought to be understood in consequentialist terms.
That is, it appears to imply that a collateral damage-causing act of war is
morally justifiable only if that act's good consequences (e.g., the prevention of harm to other noncombatants) outweigh its bad consequences
(e.g., the harm done to noncombatants killed in the attack). Yet such
consequentialist reasoning seems antithetical to the apparently nonconsequentialist distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war
essential to the concept of collateral damage, a point I discuss in greater
detail later in this chapter.5 We do better, I suggest, to use the deliberately
vague phrase "sufficient reason" when formulating this condition for the
justifiability of acts under the DDE, since it leaves open the question of
what counts as a sufficient reason for causing harm to noncombatants,
as well as the question of what sort of moral reasoning ought to be used
to justify treating a particular consideration as a sufficient reason. The
question of how to interpret the third condition of the DDE, which for
convenience sake I will continue to refer to as the proportionality condition, is taken up at greater length later. For now, the crucial point to
note is that according to the DDE, the fact that the combatant does not
intend to harm noncombatants is not enough to show that his conduct
is morally permissible.
The attraction of the DDE to many just war theorists lies in the fact that
it appears to reconcile a nonconsequentialist approach to the morality of
4 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 153; Henry Shue, "War," in The Oxford Handbook ofPractical

Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 745-47; Robert L. Holmes, On H'<ir and
Morality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989): 194.
5 In anticipation of that discussion, consider the following question: if an act of war that
harms people is morally justifiable as Jong as it is reasonable to expect that it will produce
more good than bad, then why should it matter whether those harmed by the act arc
combatants or noncombatants?
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warfare with the fact that modern war almost inevitably results in collateral damage. An essential element of a nonconsequentialist moral theory
is the claim that in some cases it is not permissible to bring about the best
consequences. People are entitled to be treated (or not treated) in certain ways, and no amount of good consequences, however understood,
justifies the failure to treat them in the ways to which they are entitled.
The right not to be unjustly killed or injured by others is among the most
important and widely recognized of these entitlements, and the infliction
of collateral damage in war appears to violate this right. The DDE, and
in particular the alleged moral significance of the distinction between
what a combatant intends and what he or she merely foresees, explains
how combatants can engage in collateral damage-causing activities without violating others' rights. Though agents are never morally permitted
intentionally to kill someone who has done nothing to forfeit his right
not to be killed, morality does permit them to perform an act they merely
foresee will result in the death of such a person, as long as it meets the
proportionality condition.
The DDE purports to justify a collateral damage-causing act of war if
and only if the harm inflicted on noncombatants is unintended and proportional to the good achieved by that act. But what reason do we have to
think that collateral damage-causing acts of war are morally permissible
if, but only if, they meet these conditions? To respond to this question,
its defenders typically attempt to demonstrate that the DDE's prescriptions - that is, what it instructs moral agents to do - match most people's
intuitive judgments regarding the rightness or wrongness of particular
acts. Of special relevance here is the claim that the DDE accounts for the
moral distinction many people intuitively draw between terror bombing
and tactical bombing. Suppose that both bombers carry out attacks that
have the same probability of causing the same number of noncombatant
deaths. What distinguishes them, it is said, is that the terror bomber intentionally targets noncombatants in order to weaken her enemy's morale,
while the tactical bomber merely foresees that his attack on a legitimate
target of war will also cause collateral damage. Since the terror bomber
intends the deaths of noncombatants, her act is morally impermissible. In
contrast, because the tactical bomber merely foresees, but does not aim
at, the deaths of noncombatants, his act is morally permissible (assuming
that it meets the proportionality condition).
As Jonathan Bennett points out, however, the terror bomber need not
intend the deaths of the noncombatants, but only the appearance of
their deaths, since this will suffice as a means to her end of weakening
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her enemy's morale. 6 That these noncombatants appear dead is what she
aims at; that they will in fact die as a result of her action is a foreseen, but
unintended, consequence of making them appear dead. Thus neither the
terror bomber nor the tactical bomber intends to harm the noncombatants
her or his actions affect, though both foresee that their actions will result
in such harm. It appears, therefore, that the DDE does not distinguish
morally between terror and tactical bombings; insofar as it provides a
justification for the latter, it also provides a justification for the former.
The reader might object that the terror bomber must intend to kill
the noncombatants she does, because their deaths are a necessary part
of her plan to weaken enemy morale. There is no way for her to make
these noncombatants appear dead except by doing something to them
that will in fact cause them to die. In contrast, it might be suggested, the
noncombatant deaths caused by the tactical bomber are not a necessary
part of his plan to destroy the legitimate target of war. He can still achieve
his goal even if, miraculously, his act results in no collateral damage. Yet
the same is true of the terror bomber; if by some miracle she achieves
her goal without killing any noncombatants, then this is fine with her. It
might be objected that no miracle will happen, that the terror bomber
knows with near certainty that she will achieve her objective only if she
kills noncombatants, and that therefore she must intend their deaths.
But similarly, no miracle will happen in the tactical bomber's case. He,
too, knows with near certainty that achieving his objective will result in
noncombatant deaths. Therefore, insofar as we are willing to say that the
tactical bomber need not intend the noncombatant deaths his act will
cause, so too we ought to say that the terror bomber need not intend the
noncombatant deaths her act will cause.
Insofar as many contributors to the just war tradition rely on the DDE
to distinguish terrorism from morally permissible forms of warfare, the
foregoing argument already provides a significant challenge for theorists
of just war. But, in fact, Bennett's argument threatens to undermine the
practical relevance of the DDE entirely, insofar as it seems possible to
describe any act in such a way that the bad consequences it produces are
merely foreseen, but not intended. In principle, the DDE would still distinguish between morally permissible and impermissible acts. In practice,

6 Jonathan

Bennett, "Morality and Consequences," in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
II, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, i981 ): uo-1 i. See
also Judith Lichtenberg, "War, Innocence, and the Doctrine of Double Effect," Philosophical Studie57 4 ( i 994): 347-68.
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however, agents would merely need to make sure that they never intended
the bad consequences of their acts, and as long as they did so, they would
not run afoul of the DDE.
Recognition of this fact may well lead to a deeper concern with the
DDE, namely, the implication that an agent's intention can determine the
rightness or wrongness of her act. As J udithJarvis Thomson observes, even
if an agent's intention is relevant to the question of whether she ought to
be praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished for her act, it seems odd to
claim that an agent's intention can determine an act's permissibility or
impermissibility.7 Imagine a case in which a bomber pilot can carry out
an attack on a military target that will collaterally kill 10 noncombatants,
but that will swiftly bring to an end a long and bloody war. Suppose
further, however, that while the bomber pilot knows his attack will have
this consequence, he does not aim at it. Rather, he has a long-standing
childish feud with one of the noncombatants and so carries out the attack
with the sole intention of killing that person. Though the bomber's poor
character may repel us, surely we do not think it makes his act, one that
ends a long and bloody war, impermissible. Yet the DDE appears to have
precisely this implication. 8
Thus far we have identified two challenges to the use of the DDE to
justify certain collateral damage-causing acts of war. First, it is not clear
that we can characterize the idea of what an agent intends and the idea of
what an agent merely foresees so that the DDEjustifies all and only those
acts of war we intuitively judge to be permissible. Second, it seems odd to
think that an act that would otherwise be wrong can be made right simply
because of what an agent intends to achieve by it, and vice versa. The
philosopher Warren Quinn offers a response to each of these challenges.
Quinn suggests that a person can be properly described as intending
harm to others when the harm comes to the victims "at least in part from
the agent's deliberately involving them in something in order to further
his purpose precisely by way of their being so involved." 9 In contrast, an
7Judith.Jarvis Thomson, "Self Defense," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 4 ( 19~)1 ): 283c\ IO; Thomson, "Physician Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments," Ethics 109 ( 1999):

497-5 1 8.
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304-5; F. M. Kamm, "Failures ofJmt \\'ar Theory: Terror, Harm, and Justice," Ethics 114
(2004): 666-69.
9\Varren S. Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double
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agent merely foresees that his act will result in harm to others if he does
not involve them in something for this reason, or his involving them in
something for this reason does not contribute to the harm they suffer.
Using Quinn's characterization of intending harm, it is possible to distinguish terror bombing from tactical bombing. The terror bomber involves
those noncombatants she kills in the bombing precisely because doing
so will further her goal oflowering enemy morale. This is so whether she
aims to kill them or aims only to make them appear dead. Thus she can
be properly characterized as intending the deaths of the noncombatants
she kills. On the other hand, the tactical bomber does not involve those
noncombatants he kills because doing so will further his goal; since this
is not his reason for involving them, he can be properly characterized as
merely foreseeing their deaths. Assuming the proportionality condition
is met, the tactical bomber acts justifiably according to the DDE, while
the terror bomber does not.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Quinn provides a satisfactory
account of the difference between intending harm to others and merely
foreseeing that one's act will cause harm to others as a side effect. It
remains necessary to explain why this distinction makes a difference to
the moral permissibility of an agent's act. Holding all else equal, why does
the fact that an agent involves others in something precisely in order to
further his purpose by doing so render that act morally wrong? Why is
it that were this not the reason why the agent involved those others, his
act would be morally permissible? Quinn responds to these questions
as follows. The terror bomber sees the noncombatants as "material to
be strategically shaped or framed by his agency," an opportunity to be
exploited in the pursuit of victory in the war. 10 The tactical bomber, on the
other hand, does not have this attitude toward the noncombatants he kills;
he does not view them "as if they were then and there for his purposes." 11
Quinn claims that taking this attitude to noncombatants - seeing them
(and their deaths) as merely then and there for his purposes- constitutes
a wrong done to them distinct from any other harm they suffer. 12 He
concludes, therefore, that there is a greater moral presumption against
wibid., 187.
Ibid.
12
Quinn writes, "This aspect of direct agency [people being involved in something at the
cost of something protected by their independent moral rights (such as their life, their
bodily integrity, or their freedom)] adds its own negative moral force - a force over and
above that provided by the fact of harming or failing to prevent harm" (Quinn, "Actions,"
187).
11
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actions like that of the terror bomber than actions like that of the tactical
bomber.
But why does adopting a certain attitude toward noncombatants count
as a wrong done to them distinct from, and in addition to, any wrong they
suffer in virtue of their treatment at the hands of the terror bomber? 1 3
Unless some sense can be made of the claim that merely by thinking
of the noncombatants as "then and there for his purposes," the terror
bomber wrongs them, Thomson's point about the evaluative significance
of an agent's intention (or attitude) applies. Because the terror bomber
views noncombatants as mere strategic opportunities to be exploited, we
may judge him to be a worse person than the tactical bomber. Yet on the
assumption that both bombers inflict the same harm, in the same way, on
the same number of noncombatants, nothing appears to distinguish the
actions themselves. In both cases, the noncombatants e1tjoy a right not to
be killed unjustly. Unless they have done something to forfeit that right, or
they have voluntarily waived it, their deaths at the hands of a combatant
who can (or should) reasonably foresee that his action will have this
consequence violates those noncombatants' rights. Indeed, Quinn may
recognize this, for he does not use the DDE to show that tactical bombing
is permissible, while terror bombing is not, but rather to show that the
latter is morally worse than the former. It appears, therefore, that even if
we accept Quinn's claim that in adopting the attitude he does, the terror
bomber commits a distinct wrong to the noncombatants he involves in
his action, we are still no closer to a justification for collateral damagecausing acts of war.
Quinn does characterize people's rights as prima facie, meaning that
in some cases they may be overridden or defeated by other (moral) considerations. The proportionality condition of the DDE might then be
understood to state when this happens: that is, what sorts of moral reasons defeat the right in question. Perhaps, then, when Quinn states that
the terror bombers' attitude makes his action morally worse than the
tactical bomber's, he means to claim that the terror bomber must have a
weightier or stronger reason tojustify his action than is required of the tactical bomber. Such a view has much in common with one interpretation

1

:1 It may be that the attitude ofa person who c1mes harm to another can affect the amount
of harm caused; for instance, the same plnsical harm clone from hatred ma\' inflict a
greater psychological harm than if it""'"" done reckkssl\'. But Quinn docs not appear
to ha\'e this sort of thing in mind in his discus.sion of the moral rek\'<lllCC of an a~ent's
attitude toward the person he harms.
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of Aquinas's understanding of the DDE.14 An agent's intention in carrying out a normally prohibited act does not figure in the justification of
that act. Rather, an agent's intention serves as a condition on that act's
permissibility. In other words, the agent's intention is not what makes the
act right (permissible); the presence of some other factor, call it X, does
so. The agent's intention can make the act wrong (impermissible), however, even ifX is present. For example, though killing people is normally
wrong, Aquinas believes it to be justifiable in self-defense. The justifiability of such a killing does not require that the agent merely foresee, but
not intend, the death of her unjust assailant. It does require, however,
that in killing her unjust assailant, the agent intend only to protect her
life; if she acts with the intention of trying out her new gun, then her act
is not permissible. For Aquinas, a bad intention absolutely prohibits certain otherwise justifiable acts, while on the preceding interpretation of
Quinn's claim, it merely makes such acts harder (but perhaps not impossible) to justify. In both cases, though, the agent's intention does not
justify the action, but instead serves as a condition on its permissibility.
The same consideration that makes many people doubt that an agent's
intention can affect the justifiability of an act also serves to undermine
the claim that an agent's intention provides a condition on an otherwise
permissible act. If an agent kills an unjust assailant because she wants to
try out her new gun, most will think her character suspect, but many will
also think her act justifiable. (Of course, knowledge of her intention may
lead us to examine more carefully her claim that she was under unjust
assault.) Perhaps a virtue ethicist such as Aquinas would argue that having
the right intention is an essential ingredient of doing the right action (as
the notion of a sin seems to combine both acting wrongly and having a
bad intention). But it is not clear that virtue ethicists must make such a
claim: they might define a right action as one that a virtuous person would
do, without requiring that a person have the mental state necessary to
count as virtuous. In any case, given our task of examining the conditions
under which collateral damage-causing acts of war are morallyjustifiable,
whether an agent's intention serves as a condition on the permissibility
of an act is a less pressing issue than determining the grounds of the
justification itself. Thus far, however, we have yet to do so. 1 5
14 See
1

Alison Mclnytre, "Doing Away with Double Effect," Ethics 111 (2001). 247-50.
regret that space does not permit me to discuss F. M. Kamm's multiple objections to the
use of the DDE to justify collateral damage, or the various rationales she offers to defend
causing (intended or unintended) harm to noncombatants in certain sorts of cases.
Those interested in exploring these issues in greater detail are strongly encouraged to
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II. Social Contract Arguments and Collateral Damage
The arguments set out in the previous section suggest that the proportionality condition of the DDE does all of the justificatory work, for it is
this condition that establishes (or, perhaps better, reflects) the extent to
which people are morally required to limit their conduct so as to avoid
causing harm to others. tli The crucial issue, then, does not concern the
combatant's state of mind when he carries out a particular collateral
damage-causing act, but rather whether in doing that act he exceeds the
bounds of what he is morally at liberty to do (or, to use a more contentious
phrase, whether he violates the rights of those he collaterally kills).
I suggested in the previous section that the proportionality condition
is best formulated as requiring that a combatant have a sufficient reason
to warrant doing an act that can be reasonably expected to cause harm to
noncombatants. What sorts of considerations can provide such a reason?
The usual formulation of the proportionality condition suggests a consequen tialist response to this question: the fact that a given act of war
inflicts harm on noncombatants proportional to the good achieved as
a result of that same act provides a reason sufficient to justify it. Upon
closer inspection, though, most of those who employ this formulation of
the proportionality condition do not adhere very closely to consequentialism. 1 7 For example, they tend to assume that the good achieved by an
act of war must be significantly greater than the evil that same act causes
in order for the act to be justifiable. Likewise, only certain sorts of goods
or evils ought to figure in the calculation: the economic benefits of a
particular act of war that harms noncombatants do not count toward that
act's justifiability (except insofar as they contribute to a swifter victory
in the war). A purely consequentialist approach would not accept these
sorts of constraints on the justifiability of acts of war. 18 The fact that many

read Kamm, "Failures of Just War Theory," as well as Kamm, ".Justifications for Killing
Noncombatants in War," Midwest Studirs in Philosophy XXIV (2000): 219-28.
16 Because of the DD E's focus on the combatant's state of mind when he carries out an
attack, it~ defenders often emphasize that the proportionality condition requires combatants to exercise reasonable or due care to aYoid even unintentionally causing harm
to noncombatants. But to exercise due care is simply to (make a good faith effort to)
conform to certain standards setting out the extent to which people are morally required
to limit their conduct so as to a\'oid causing harm to others.
1
7 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; A.J Coates, 711f Fthirs of \for (:\!anchester, UK: Uniwrsity of
Manchester Press, 1997) 245-4G.
18 For those unclear as to why this is so, see the discu5'ion of consl'qnentialism in the
following section.
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discussants of proportionality in the context of the DDE do assume them
provides one reason to think that the proportionality condition is not
merely the ad hoc addition of a consequentialist moral principle to an
essentially nonconsequentialist moral theory.
Suppose that these philosophers are right to forgo using consequentialist moral reasoning to determine what counts as a sufficient reason
for causing collateral damage. What sort of nonconsequentialist argument might a theorist employ to illuminate the idea of a sufficient reason
for causing harm to noncombatants? One possibility, recently discussed
by David Rodin, involves an appeal to agents' exercise of autonomous
choice. '9 Rodin begins his discussion of collateral damage by first considering what generally justifies acts that impose a risk of harm on people
other than the actor. He suggests that two conditions must be met to justify
them: first, "the party assuming the risk [must also be] the beneficiary of
the risk-producing activity," and second, the risk must be "autonomously
assumed either individually or collectively by those who bear [it] ." 20 Thus
a doctor is morallyjustified in performing a risky operation on a patient if
he gives his free and informed consent to it, but not otherwise. Likewise,
rules permitting police cars to speed or ambulances to run red lights are
morallyjustifiable when they are the result of collective decisions that produce benefits for the community as a whole, on the condition that the risk
of harm is distributed fairly across all members of the community. Thus,
in a community with rules regulating the driving of ambulances that meet
these conditions, an innocent bystander killed by an ambulance running
a red light will not necessarily be wronged. 21 In sum, the fact that the relevant agents exposed to a certain risk of harm from others' activities also
benefit from those activities, and the fact that they have autonomously
assumed that risk, entails that these agents have no claim not to suffer
the harm they do when the risk is realized. That they have no such claim
entails that the person who does the risky activity is morally free to act as
he does; for example, the ambulance driver enjoys a moral liberty to run
1

9 David Rodin, "Terrorism without Intention," Ethics 114 (2004): 752-7 i.
Ibid., 766-67.
21
I say not necessarily be wronged because there will likely be specific constraints on ambulances running a red light, and an ambulance driver who does not adhere to those
constraints will wrong the person he kills. Note, too, that the community may make it
a condition for ambulances running red lights that those harmed as a result be compensated by the ambulance company, the hospital, or the community as a whole. But
when justified in this manner, such civil liability is not indicative of a moral wrong, and
assuming that the ambulance driver obeyed the specific constraints on running a red
light, he should not (and likely will not) be convicted of a crime.
20
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red lights. It is this moral liberty, and the value of autonomous choice
from which it is derived, that provides a sufficient reason for doing acts
that, in some cases, cause harm to innocent parties (i.e., people who have
done nothing that makes them liable to being harmed by this actor in
this particular manner).
Rodin's general justification for risky activities suffers from a number of
shortcomings. 22 For example, it seems implausible to claim that authoritarian political communities such as China, North Korea, and Zimbabwe
collectively decide that the benefits ofallowing ambulances to run red lights
warrant the risk of harm to each member created by such a practice. Yet it
also seems implausible to claim that the absence of such a collective decision necessarily renders the risk created by ambulances running red lights
in those states morally unjustified. This difficulty with Rodin's argument
can be met by shifting from a focus on actual consent to, or assumption
of, risk, to some sort of hypothetical consent to, or assumption of, risk. It is
because suitably specified agents would agree to a rule permitting ambulances to run red lights (at least under certain conditions) that these
practices are morally justifiable even in states like China or Zimbabwe,
despite the fact that the actual rules governing the driving of ambulances
in those states are not the product of a collective decision.
Our concern, however, is not with the risk of harm to innocent parties
created by ambulances running red lights, but rather with the risk of harm
to noncombatants caused by acts of war. Drawing on his general account
of what justifies risky activities, Rodin concludes that with the possible
exception of humanitarian intervention, collateral damage-causing acts
of war are morally unjustifiable. In most military conflicts, Rodin asserts,
"there is no sense in which the party who bears the risk of harm benefits
from the risky activity. Neither have they autonomously chosen, either
individually or collectively, to bear the risks of the bombardment." 2 3 The
conclusion we ought to draw, then, is that collateral damage-causing
acts of war are morally unjustifiable.24 Noncombatants have a claim not
to be exposed to the risk of harm that is a practically unavoidable concomitant of combat. It follows that combatants are not morally at liberty to impose the risk of harm on noncombatants that they do impose
I discuss these in greater detail in Lefkowitz, "Collateral Damage and Dirtv Hands,"
unpublished, on tile with author
2
3 Rodin, "Terrorism," 767.
2
4 Strictly speaking, Rodin claims onh that the standards of due care for waging war art>
much higher than what is required bv existing mtcrnational humanitarian law. I lowc\cr,
I believe that his argument actuallv entails th" <trnngcr conclusio11 set out in the text.
22

David Lefkowitz
when they wage war. The absence of such a liberty means that combatants do not have a sufficient reason to justify the harm they cause to
noncombatants.
It is not clear whether the move to hypothetical consent sketched here
enables us to avoid the conclusion Rodin draws with respect to the moral
justifiability of collateral damage. Whether it does so depends on how we
ought to conceive of the agents negotiating the hypothetical agreement
that establishes what sorts ofrisky activities are justifiable (in what circumstances, with what conditions, etc.), and perhaps also the circumstances
in which they negotiate. Though space does not permit me to pursue
that investigation here, it is worth noting some of the ways in which the
conception of the agents' negotiating this hypothetical agreement will significantly influence the case for or against the justifiability of collateral
damage. For instance, the relative importance the hypothetical negotiators assign to (their own) life and liberty will affect their willingness to
assume the risks involved in the conduct of war. If, properly conceived,
these agents assign life a far greater value than liberty, then they will place
very narrow constraints on, and perhaps even absolutely forbid, acts of
war that impose a risk of harm to noncombatants when undertaken in
order to attain or protect individual liberty or political sovereignty. Consider, too, the claim made by one prominent defender of the hypothetical
consent approach to moral justification (broadly construed) that "the justifiability of a moral principle depends only on various individuals' reasons
for objecting to that principle and alternatives to it." 2 5 That is, agents are
to appeal only to the impact a particular principle and the alternatives to
it will have on their own pursuit of a good life. This individualist restriction may well rule out the argument that often seems to be lurking in
the background in many discussions of collateral damage, namely, that
collaterally killing some noncombatants is permissible if it is necessary
to prevent some greater number of noncombatants from being killed. If
true, the individualist restriction entails that no individual member of the
larger group can point to the fact that more noncombatants will die if the
collateral damage-causing act is forgone, since each may only appeal to
his or her own death as a reason to reject a principle that forbids collateral killing. It may be, then, that any hypothetical contract moral theorist
committed to the individualist restriction will find it extremely difficult
to justify collateral damage-causing acts of war.
2

5

T. M. Scanlon, \!\-'hat We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1998)~ 229.
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At this point, I think it safe to draw the following conclusions. First, the
DDE does not provide a compelling justification for collateral damage.
Even apart from any difficulties there may be in specifying the concepts
of intended harm and merely foreseen harm (or harm as a side effect), it
remains unclear why we should view the agent's intention as relevant to
the rightness or wrongness of his act. Moreover, we do not yet have a convincing account of the proportionality condition: that is, of what sorts of
considerations provide a sufficient reason to justify acts of war that it is reasonable to expect will cause collateral damage. Contrary to what some of
their remarks might suggest, most of those who discuss the proportionality condition do not appear to be employing consequentialist moral
reasoning. Yet as we have just seen, one of the most common forms of
nonconsequentialist reasoning, namely, appeal to actual or hypothetical
agreement, may not yield a justification for collateral damage. Importantly, this is so regardless of whether the agent's intentions matter to
the moral justifiability of his acts (i.e., whether the DDE is a true moral
principle, or not). Barring further argument, therefore, it appears that
nonconsequentialist moral theorists ought to conclude that collateral
damage-causing acts of war are morally unjustifiable.

III. Consequentialism and Collateral Damage
On the one hand, it appears that consequentialist moral theories can
easily justify collateral damage. Despite the fact that they inflict harm
on noncombatants, a particular collateral damage-causing act of war is
morally justifiable insofar as it produces a net increase in social utility
or welfare, for instance, if that act prevents an even greater amount of
harm to (an even greater number of) other noncombatants. On the other
hand, given a consequentialist account of the just conduct of war, there
is no reason to be concerned specifically with the justification of collateral damage (at least as defined at the outset of this chapter), for if we
ought to be concerned only with the overall consequences of an act, and
in particular with whether that act produces a net increase in total welfare, then it should make no difference whether those harmed by the act
are legitimate or illegitimate targets of war, or whether the harm done to
noncombatants is intended or merely a foreseen side·effect. Indeed, once
we adopt a consequentialist approach, it seems that the very distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate targets of war disappears. A consequentialistjustification for acts of war appears to entail that no person or
category of persons is necessarily such that targeting him (i.e., mtending
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to do him harm) is morally impermissible. While the consequentialist
might still distinguish between the harm a combatant aims to cause and
that which he merely foresees he will cause, this distinction will not be
viewed as having any moral significance in itself.
While consequentialism clearly can provide a moral justification for
collateral damage, some readers may find deeply unsettling the implication that, under the right conditions, combatants may intentionally harm
noncombatants. That is, a strong conviction that combatants ought not
to target noncombatants, even if doing so will produce better overall
consequences, may lead some to reject the use of consequentialist moral
reasoning to justify acts of war, including those that cause collateral damage. In response, a sophisticated consequentialist will likely adopt one of
the follmving two strategies. Either she will argue that despite the appearances to the contrary, consequentialism does absolutely forbid targeting
noncombatants. Or she will argue that consequentialism forbids targeting
noncombatants in all those cases where, intuitively, most people believe
it would be wrong to do so, but also argue that in a few cases most people
will conclude that it is permissible to harm noncombatants intentionally,
and that consequentialism justifies these beliefs. I briefly describe each
of these strategies in turn.
The claim that consequentialism cannot justify an absolute prohibition
on targeting noncombatants assumes that an act's consequences are what
make a particular act right or wrong. 26 Specifically, act-consequentialism
identifies an act as wrong ifand only ifit produces less good overall than
would have been produced by some alternative act the agent could have
done. However, some consequentialists reject this criterion for the rightness or wrongness of an act. Instead, they argue that while consequences
alone provide the justification for moral rules or principles, what makes a
particular act wrong is that it violates one or more of these moral rules or
principles. This account of right action is called rule-consequentialism. 2 7
Suppose that, of all the possible rules for regulating acts of war that affect
non combatants, the following rule produces the best consequences:

26 Such

a claim also assumes that it is not necessarily true that targeting noncombatants
will always produce worse consequences than those that will result from only targeting
combatants.
2
7 A reader familiar with the details of consequentialism will recognize that the descriptions
in the text of both act and rule consequentialism are very rough. For example, no effort
is made to distinguish between actual and expected versions of either criterion for right
action, or between full and partial compliance versions. I set aside these important details
in the interest of providing greater accessibility to a wide audience.
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combatants may never carry out acts of war that target noncombatants,
but they may carry out acts of war that they foresee will result in harm to
noncombatants as a side effect, as long as that harm is proportional to the
good achieved by those acts of war. According to rule-C, only those acts
that conform to this rule are morally permissible, and what makes them
permissible is that they conform to this rule. What makes the rule one
to which combatants ought to conform is that no other rule produces
better consequences. Thus rule-C reconciles many people's conviction
that noncombatants ought never to be a target of war with the consequentialist claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act is ultimately a
matter of its consequences. Indeed, if rule-C does in fact justify the rule
set out previously, then it provides a consequentialist justification for the
DDE. 28
Whether rule-C provides a convincing justification for some collateral
damage-causing acts of war depends ultimately on its plausibility as a general account of right and wrong actions. 2 9 But even if rule-C ultimately
proves to be indefensible, a consequentialist may adopt the second strategy noted previously in order to defend the justifiability of killing in war,
including in some cases intentionally or unintentionally killing noncombatants.
She will begin by noting that, in general, act-consequentialism does not
justify intentionally causing harm to noncombatants. This is so for a number of reasons. First, at least in the near term, noncombatants typically
pose much less threat of future harm than do combatants. Therefore,
killing the typical noncombatant will do little to prevent future harm,
though it will cause substantial harm in the present. Second, the belief
that an opposing state's military is trying to harm their compatriot noncombatants appears to strengthen the commitment to continuing the
war on the part of both combatant and noncombatant members of the
victim state. During World War II, both the British and the German air
forces carried out massive attacks against each other's urban noncombatant populations, allegedly from the belief that it would so demoralize
the general population that they would press their governments to sue
for peace. In fact, these bombing campaigns may well have had exactly
z:l Note that given a rule consequentialistjustification for the DD£, whether an ageut intends
or merely foresees that he
harm noncombatants has no importance in itself. Rather,
what justifies adherence to a rule that prohibits intending harm while allowing merely
foreseen harm (that is proportional) is that it produces the best consequences.
2
9 For one defense of a rule C approach to the just conduct of war, see R. B. Brandt,
"Utilitarianism and the Rules of\\'ar," l'hi/osop!tv and l'uhlu· ,1fjilin ( 1971172): q5-G,;.
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the opposite effect. Given the view that what justifies particular acts of
war is that they produce less harm than would result from alternative acts
open to the agent, and given that in most cases intentionally attacking
noncombatants tends to prolong the war, and so increases the harm it
produces, the act-C will conclude that deliberate attacks on noncombatants are rarely justifiable.3° Finally, one party's decision to adopt a policy
of intentionally targeting or recklessly endangering noncombatants may
lead other parties involved in the war to adopt a similar policy. Such a
chain of events will almost certainly result in worse consequences than
if the parties to the conflict generally make their behavior conform to a
rule like the DDE.
The reader will surely have noticed that all of the preceding claims
contain qualifiers like "in general," "typically," and "usually." The actC may endorse something like the DDE as a rule of thumb, a useful
heuristic device for determining whether a particular act of war is morally
permissible. But since what justifies a particular act are its consequences,
and not its conformity to a rule such as the DDE, the act-consequentialist
must acknowledge that circumstances may arise in which it is permissible,
indeed even obligatory, to act contrary to the rule. Thus while the actconsequentialist's analysis of the DDE as a rule of thumb entails significant
constraints on the just conduct of war, it will not satisfy those convinced
that morality absolutely forbids intentionally killing noncombatants.
The act-consequentialist may challenge this conviction, however, using
the following example. Suppose that a general must choose between
strategies A and B for capturing a militarily crucial city. Both of these
strategies have the same probability of success, but strategy A will involve
the death of 10,000 combatants, but no noncombatants, while strategy
B will involve the death of 10 noncombatants, and no combatants. Is
it really the case that the general must choose strategy A, and so the
death of 10,000 people, over strategy B, and the death of only 10 people?
Reflection on this case, or something like it, may lead many people to the
conclusion that in rare cases, morality permits or even requires intentional attacks against noncombatants. If so, then the conviction that
must be accounted for is not "morality never permits intentionally killing
3°This same reasoning may figure as well in a consequentialist account of why, in general,
even merely foreseen harm to noncombatants is permissible only if the good achieved
is significantly greater than the harm done. The perception that an opposing state's
military forces care nothing for the harm they cause to noncombatants, though they do
not intentionally target them, may also deepen the commitment of members of the victim
state to prosecuting the war.
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noncombatants" but rather "morality rarely permits intentionally killing
noncombatants." Act-consequentialism not only accommodates the latter
intuition, it also provides a rationale for it.
Yet awareness of the fact that under certain conditions actconsequentialism permits the targeting of noncombatants may lead combatants to do so even when these conditions are not met. Indeed, given the
uncertainties endemic to warfare, and the likely biases of those engaged
in them, combatants will almost certainly err when making such judgments. It may be, then, that act-consequentialism will require combatants to adhere strictly to a rule like the DDE, since by doing so they are
more likely to act as morality requires - understood here in terms of producing the best overall consequences - than if they try to determine in
each particular case whether targeting noncombatants is morally permissible.3' Thus both act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism may
entail that when deliberating, combatants ought to abide by a rule like
the DDE.32
Though the preceding discussion suggests various ways in which a consequentialist might justify collateral damage-causing acts of war, several
concerns with such an argumentative strategy remain. First, I have simply assumed that consequentialism will justify a rule like the DDE, or at
least a rule that corresponds to most people's intuitions regarding which
acts of war are, or are not, morally justifiable. Yet this assumption may
well be false; consequentialism may condone far more killing of noncombatants, intentionally or unintentionally, than I have suggested here.
Second, though the act-consequentialist may concede that instrumentalepistemic considerations entail that combatants ought to adhere strictly
to a rule like the DDE, she will regret this fact. That is, she will lament
the fact that in some cases, though we know not which ones, combatants

Note that this argument justifies adherence to the DDE even in those cases where the
combatant would have produced better consequences in that particular instance had he
acted contrary to the rule.
3 2 Act consequentialists may not be the only ones who will defend adherence to the DDE on
instrumental/ epistemic grounds, e\·en though they think that such a rule sometimes fails
to reflect what morality truly requires. For example, a nonconscqucntialist might argue
that only those who bear (a certain degree of) moral responsibility for an unjust war may
be targeted. This may well entail that, in many wars, it is not inorally permissible to kill
certain combatants, while it is penrnssible to kill certain noncombatants. H011·c,·er, this
nonconsequentialist may also argue that in light of various facts about hunrnn nature and
the circumstances of war, combatants will best approximate what moralitv truly requires
if they adhere to the DDE, rather than seeking to determine in each case the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a potential target.
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did not intentionally target noncombatants. Some of those convinced
that targeting noncombatants is never morally permissible will find such
an attitude troubling, and so find an act-consequentialistjustification for
the absolute prohibition on intending harm to noncombatants unsatisfactory. The act-consequentialist's regret points to a third concern with
consequentialist accounts ofjust conduct in war, namely, that they do not
take the separateness of persons seriously. Many philosophers argue that
there are certain things you cannot do to a person, even if it will produce
a substantial increase in overall welfare. Given its commitment to social
or total welfare as the ultimate criterion for right action, consequentialism cannot provide a principled justification for this claim. Thus, even
if consequentialism can provide a contingent justification for never targeting noncombatants, it cannot justify this absolute prohibition on the
grounds that noncombatants have a fundamental claim not to be used
for the benefit of others (at least without their consent).

N. Pacifism in Practice?
More might be said in defense of each of the alleged moral justifications
for collateral damage that I have discussed. Suppose, however, that even
upon further consideration no defense proves to be satisfactory. If so,
then it appears that in practice the moral person ought to become a
pacifist, for it will be nearly impossible for him or her to wage war without
acting immorally. Two responses to this conclusion are worth considering,
though I cannot discuss them in detail here. First, one might claim that it
is absurd to think that the use of armed force to resist genocide is morally
justifiable only as long as it inflicts no collateral damage. We have more
confidence in this judgment than in the theoretical argument against
the permissibility of collateral damage-causing acts of war. Therefore,
though at present we may lack a justification for collateral damage, we
ought not to conclude that morality requires us to be pacifists. Second,
even if all collateral damage-causing acts are wrong, might it still be a
good thing (in some sense) that some of them are done? Making sense
of this idea - namely, that collateral damage can be an instance of dirty
hands - may prove impossible, but it seems worthy offurther exploration.

